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RYLE ON DISPOSITIONS AND HYPOTHETICALS 
by Robert W. Burch 
In The Concept of Mind,' Professor Ryle gives an analysis of dispositions 
which is puzzling if it is taken strictly and literally. Perhaps by exploring what 
is thus puzzling about Ryle's analysis we shall better understand what it 
means. 
I 
Ryle uses "dispositional" to label properties of various sorts, including 
capacities (or abilities, skills, or powers) (CM, 42,45, and 118-1 19), inclina- 
tions (or bents) (CM, 33 and 45), susceptibilities (CM, 33), habits (CM, 33), 
liabilities (CM, 43,45, 1 18, and 123), tendencies (CM,  1 17- 118 and 13 1- 133), 
propensities (CM, 123), pronenesses (CM,  118-1 19 and 133), and likelihoods 
(CM, 43). A main thesis of The Concept of Mind is that many of the notions 
we use to describe peopIe's mental life, and which we often wrongly take 
to refer to the occurrence of "ghostly7' mental causes, actually signify disposi- 
tions. Obviously, Ryle has the task of giving a more or less precise charac- 
terization of dispositional properties, and he does so by maintaining that 
propositions attributing dispositional properties are, in effect, hypotheticals. 
Roughly, the idea is that a brittle substance is one which, ifhit, will shatter; 
a vain man is a man who, if he gets a chance, will boast or otherwise seek 
his own glory; and a skillful tennis player is one who, ifthe circumstances 
are not adverse, will play well. Ryle does not provide a general statement 
saying exactly what the equivalence between dispositional statements and 
hypotheticals amounts to,? but in any event, his thesis implies that disposi- 
tion-attributing propositions are materially equivalent to some Iogical com- 
plex of hypothetical propositions. Understood literally this thesis is puzzling, 
especially when taken in conjunction with several other things Ryle says 
about dispositions. Let us look at a couple of these things. 
First, Ryle nearly equates dispositional statements with laws." Laws are, 
or are also statable as, open-i.e., universal-hypothetical sentences (CM, 
120). Since a law is such an open hypothetical, a law can be used as an 
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"inference ticket (a season ticket) which licenses its possessors to move from 
asserting factual statements to asserting other factual statements7' (CM, 121). 
Understanding any law, for Ryle, involves being able to apply it in concrete 
cases, and applying a law is making concrete inferences from and to particular 
matters of fact, for various purposes (CM, 121). Ryle constantly emphasizes 
this feature of laws as involved in inference, argument (CM, 122), warranting 
(CM, 123), and-since laws normally function to explain events which fall 
under them-in explanation (CM, 124). Like laws, dispositional statements 
are "explanatory-cum-predictive assertions" (CM, 25). "Dispositional state- 
ments about particular things and persons are . . . like law statements in the 
fact that we use them in a partly similar way. They apply to, or they are 
satisfied by, the actions, reactions and states of the object; they are infer- 
ence-tickets, which license us to predict, retrodict, explain and modify these 
actions, reactions and states" (CM, 124). To expIain that the glass shattered 
when the rock hit it because it was brittle is to claim that the occurrence of 
the glass's shattering is an instance of (roughly) the law-like hypothetical 
"whenever a rock hits this piece of glass, etc., then it shatters," The hypo- 
thetical here simply spells out the meaning of "the glass is brittle." If we 
explain a man's actions as being from vanity, then we explain in exactly the 
same way as we do when we explain the glass's shattering as being the result 
of its brittleness. Being a vain man just is being a man who acts in certain 
recognizable ways in certain sorts of circumstances. The explanation of the 
glass's shattering and the explanation of the man's boasting both work-just 
as explanations appealing to laws do (see CM, 12 1)-by involving instantia- 
tions of universal propositions. Although Ryle does not put it quite like this, 
dispositional explanations seem to work, on his view, because they are really 
particularisations of the logically valid argument form: 
"(y) . . . (z) (P (a, y, . . ., z) implies Q (a, y, . . ., z) ) 
P (a, b, c, . . . ); 
Therefore, Q (a, b, c, . . . )." 
Secondly, for Ryle dispositional statements are not merely hypotheticals: 
they are testable hypotheticals (CM, 46 and 117): This thesis is ambiguous 
and may make either the weaker claim that a dispositional statement is logi- 
cally composed of many hypotheticals each one of which is testable, or the 
stronger claim that a dispositional statement is logically equivalent to a single 
testable hypothetical. It would not usually matter whether one said that a 
dispositional statement is equivalent to one hypothetical or to many hypo- 
theticals combined, since "(A and B) implies (C or D)" is tautologically 
equivalent to "(A implies C) or (B implies D)." But it will matter for the sake 
of my argument whether one says merely that each of "(A implies C)" and 
"(B implies D)" is testable, or also that "(A and B) implies (C or D)" is 
testable. I shall understand Ryle to hold the stronger thesis.j 
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The fundamental strategy of The Concept of Mind, by arguing that the 
mentalistic notions used to characterize people are dispositional notions, is 
to establish that it is incorrect to interpret such notions as signifying "ghostly" 
mental items or occurrences in a special realm, the mind. But it is precisely 
as applied to such human abilities, tendencies, and so on that Ryle's analysis, 
literally interpreted, seems most puzzling. What is puzzling about it is that 
it seems to assimilate specifically human abilities, tendencies, and so on, to 
material properties like brittleness and solubility, which Ryle habitually uses 
to illustrate dispositional traits. No doubt Ryle takes care to distinguish be- 
tween various sorts of dispositions, and would not want to make human 
intelligence look just exactly like the solubility of sugar. But I think that his 
analysis of dispositional statements as hypotheticals, when we interpret it 
strictly, makes it impossible to distinguish sharply enough between human 
and material properties. We can see why this is so by looking at how the 
strictly interpreted analysis fares when applied to inteIligent capacities, the 
case where the analysis has its maximum plausibility. 
Ryle, with qualification, maintains that to say that someone knows French 
"is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any 
French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately, or 
translates it correctly into his own tongue" (CM,  123). The qualification is 
that the analysis is too precise: if our someone did not do the things in the 
apodosis, but was asleep, absentminded, drunk, or in a panic, we would not 
have to take back the ability-attribution. But would not the analysis remain 
too precise even if we added to the protasis the condition that our subject 
is not absentminded, drunk, and so on? For the subject might not "respond 
pertinently in French, etc." not because he cannot speak French, and not 
because he is absentminded, drunk, and so on, but for a host of other reasons. 
To pick a few, he may not hear, may mishear, may misunderstand, or may 
have lost his voice. More seriously, he may not feel like answering, may wish 
to be rude, may wish not to strain his throat, may be loath to speak French, 
or may have the intention of misleading the addressing person. Perhaps it 
will be said that if the subject utters a garbled sentence in what is not really 
French, gives a ghastly translation, or says nothing, but does this because 
of one of the abovementioned reasons, then this response is one of the 
"appropriate responses" mentioned in the apodosis of Ryle's hypothetical. 
But this ploy only raises the problem of how we are to identify these "appro- 
priate responses." If we identify them as any responses appropriate for one 
who knows how to speak French, then we preserve the thesis that the disposi- 
tional statement in question is hypothetical in form only by making this thesis 
trivial. For on this account the thesis reduces to the triviality that "he knows 
French7' means that he gives the responses consistent with knowing, or 
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appropriate for one who knows, French. But if we identify the "appropriate 
responses" in any other way than the suggested one, then the thesis will be 
false. For, no particular response is inconsistent with knowing how to speak 
French, not even the "response" of not responding at all. That is, anything 
one does on a particular occasion is consistent with knowing how to speak 
French. One might even sincerely respond, "I don't know how to speak 
French," and this be consistent with his knowing how to speak French. He 
may not know that what he speaks is called "French." He may be so overly 
modest or perfectionistic that what others call "speaking French" he would 
not dare. He may have forgotten that he speaks French, or he may have been 
led to think mistakenly that he does not. 
It may then be suggested that by expanding the hypothetical's protasis we 
can identify the "appropriate responses" in some other way than as responses 
consistent with knowing how to speak French, and still end up with a true 
hypothetical analyzing this know-how. But how could we expand the protasis 
so as to make the hypothetical a correct analysis of the know-how? Under 
what conditions must someone who knows French respond "in the appro- 
priate way," where "the appropriate way" is identified nontrivially? That is, 
under what conditions could we definitely conclude that a person does not 
know French provided that he does not respond in the "appropriate way"? 
I say, none, unless these conditions are described in such a way as to make 
the hypothetical trivially t rue.There seems to be a very complicated and 
indefinitely numerous set of conditions which can keep a French speaker 
from, for example, uttering reasonably good French sentences or translating 
with the correct French words. He might have a nagging headache that day 
which distracts him. Some yet unidentified disease of a mental sort might 
be debilitating him. A bee might sting him at the very moment he was going 
to speak, or he might at that very moment fall and break his leg. Or more 
seriously, he might not want to try to speak French. 
A hypothetical analyzing a person's ability to speak French must then at 
least include conditions which imply that none of these sorts ofthings happen. 
This could be done in either of two ways. We could put such conditions into 
the hypothetical's protasis by conjoining them with those conditions which 
initially seemed logically to impIy that the "appropriate responses" are made. 
Or we could put the negations of these conditions into the apodosis by dis- 
joining these negations with those appropriate responses. The first way would 
yield hypotheticals like, "If he has the chance to speak French, etc., and a 
bee does not sting him, and he does not fall down, nndso on, then he translates 
correctly, etc." The second would yield, "If he has the chance to speak French, 
etc., then he either translates correctly, etc., or else a bee stings him, or he 
falls down, or etc." Of course these two ways of including these conditions 
are equivalent, since "(A and not-B) implies C" is tautologically equivalent 
to ''A implies (C or B)." 
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What is crucial here is that there seems to be no limit to the sorts of things 
that could prevent a French-knower from giving the "appropriate responses" 
nontrivially identified. So we seem to need not just any series of conditions 
in our hypothetical, but an infinite series of conditions. Ifwe insist on preserv- 
ing the hypothetical analysis of this disposition, then the hypothetical propo- 
sition in question will have to contain an infinite series of terms. I doubt the 
sense of talking about such infinite hypotheticals. But anyone who does not 
want to talk about them as a way of preserving a strict interpretation of the 
RyIean analysis of dispositions must deal with several difficulties. 
One problem with such hypotheticals, containing as they do an infinite 
string of terms, is that of their testability. For tests are finite, but a hypothetical 
with an infinite number of terms requires an infinitely long test, or an infinite 
number of finitely long tests, both of which are impossible to carry out. It 
might be suggested that we can break up the single complex hypothetical 
into a long disjunction of simple  hypothetical^,^ each ofwhich can be tested. 
But this decomposition still would not enable us to test conclusively8 for the 
truth of the hypothetical itself. And surely Ryle introduces the point about 
testable hypotheticals just to account for how we can conclusively ascertain 
facts about another person's mental goings-on. 
Another difficulty is that in$tzite hypotheticals, if we tried to use them, 
would be infinitely unwieldy, whereas "he knows French" is an easily- 
manageable proposition. The ordinary man knows quite well how to operate 
with "he is vain." With an infinite hypothetical he, like the rest of us, would 
fumble and falter. 
The most serious difficulty is that an infinite hypothetical would not serve 
to enable us to infer or predict matters of fact from other matters of fact. 
Nor would it enable us to explain, in the way Ryle indicates, matters of fact 
as following from other matters of fact. For either we never could be sure 
that the infinite series of conjoined conditions mentioned in the protasis 
obtained, or else we could never get to particular matters of fact from the 
infinite disjunction of facts, events, and conditions in the apodosis. For hypo- 
theticals to be inference-tickets, they must be finite in both protasis and 
apodosis. If they are to be explanatory-cum-predictive, they cannot be infi- 
nite. 
Before considering ways of attempting to avoid these arguments, I want 
to say why Ryle's analysis seems to assimiIate the specifically human abilities 
to the properties of materials. In at least their scientific sense, solubility and 
brittleness can be spelled out as hypotheticals in whose protasis and apodosis 
one need only include reference to afiniteg number of conditions and occur- 
rences. Solubility, for example, is defined by scientists as that property which 
matter has if it dissolves when you do certain finitely specifiable things to 
it. So there are finitely-conductible conclusive tests for solubility. Also refer- 
ence to the solubility of a lump does license us to preduct that a certain lump 
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will dissolve in certain circumstances. A soluble lump must dissolve when 
the circumstances are right. But ~ntlst French speakers do a certain finite 
number of things when the circumstances are right? No. And saying that they 
must is puzzling because it not only overlooks the unlimited complexity of 
the activities which reveal human abilities, but it also specifically implies that 
men are not free. French speakers, no matter what the circumstances are, 
can elect neither to speak French nor translate it. It will not do to suggest 
that they must speak, translate, etc., given certain circumstances. 
But Ryle's account when taken strictly does imply that in certain sorts of 
circumstances French speakers must speak French. For this account holds 
that the ability to speak French is a disposition, which in turn is to be spelled 
out as a predictive and explanatory hypothetical in whose protasis we include 
various circumstances, and in whose apodosis we include various acts, 
episodes, and events. However, if this hypothetical is to be explanatory and 
predictive, then it must be finite in its listing of these circumstances and 
events. This is sufficient to imply that French speakers must speak French, 
or do some finite number of other things, in certain finitely specifiable sorts 
of circumstances. 
For every hypothetical is like every other hypothetical in logical form; 
every hypothetical minimally asserts the same connection between its protasis 
and its apodosis: from the truth of a hypothetical and the truth of its protasis, 
you can logically infer the truth of its apodosis. Hypotheticals differ from 
one another in kind, not by being different in respect of their logical form, 
but rather only by virtue of their protatic and apodotic "stuffing." An imme- 
diate consequence of this is that, if a hypothetical spelling out of a disposi- 
tional statement is true, then when the conditions or circumstances of the 
protasis are realized, one can logically infer that the acts, episodes, and events 
of the apodosis take place." 
One might try to avoid my arguments against the hypothetical analysis 
of the ability to speak French by judiciously choosing the protasis so that 
the infinite number of relevant conditions are somehow included or sum- 
marized in it, by including in the protasis some reference to the will so that 
the objection about freedom is blocked, and by choosing apodosis in an 
obvious way. But I doubt that this strategy can work. For example, suppose 
I say that our subject's ability is equivalent to: 
If the occasion demands it and if he wants to and nothing prevents him, then he 
speaks, writes, etc., French reasonably well. 
This will not do because he may also want not to speak French, and so for 
that reason not speak it. 
Suppose we try: 
If the occasion demands ~t and if he wants to and does not want not to, and if nothing 
prevents him, then he speaks, writes, etc., French reasonably welI. 
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This will not do either because he may rather want or intend to do something 
else which precludes his speaking French well, and thus for that reason not 
speak it. We could, I suppose, make the absence of such wants or intentions 
part of the meaning of "not wanting not to speak French," or we could simply 
add to the protasis the condition that the subject does not want or intend 
any such thing. But this gains us nothing very great, for we could think easily 
of still other conditions, ad infinitum, which would account for his not speak- 
ing French reasonably well. If we tried to include all these things in the 
hypothetical then we eventually would have to add to the protasis, "and no 
reason other than inability to do so accounts for his not speaking French." 
And then we would have a true hypothetical analysis, but an obviously trivial 
one." 
Suppose we then try, as equivalent to our subject's having the ability to 
speak French: 
If he trIes to and nothing prevents him, then he speaks, writes, etc. French reasonably 
well. 
With this new suggestion a new problem comes to the fore.'"'If he tries to 
and nothing prevents him, then he speaks, writes, etc., French well" is not 
a testable hypothesis; indeed it is not even falsifiable, for it is an analytic 
truth. Thus it cannot be equivalent to "he can speak French," which is any- 
thing but anaIytic. The intended analysis is merely an analytic proposition 
because we use "prevent" so that whenever anyone tries to do  something and 
fails, then something can always be said to have prevented him from doing 
it. That something, it is to be noted, might be his inability to do it. We might 
notice this feature of the notion of being prevented from doing something, 
and accordingly modify our hypothetical to: 
If he tries to and nothing except for his inability to speak it prevents him, then he 
will speak, write, etc., French reasonably well. 
I readily grant that this proposition is materially equivalent to "he can speak 
French," and that the proposition is hypothetical in form. But the reason why 
it is materially equivalent to "he can speak French" shows us that this mate- 
rial equivalence is trivial. For example, suppose the hypothetical is false. 
Then our subject tries and is not prevented by anything other than inability 
to speak French from speaking French, but he does not speak it. So he is 
of course unable to speak French; since he tried and failed he must have 
been prevented by something (analytically), but since he is not prevented 
by anything other than his inability, then he must be prevented by his inabil- 
ity, and thus he must be unable. But what we have here is merely a round- 
about way of saying that one can speak French if and only if he is not unable 
to speak it. Hardly surprising, but hardly interesting either. 
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The argument against a literal reading of Ryle's position is strong even 
when the argument is made against its most plausible case: abilities. The 
argument is still stronger against other cases, like tendencies, pronenesses, 
liabilities, and likelihoods. Let's take tendencies first. A tendency is what we 
are talking about when we say "he (it) tends to X" or "he (it) has a tendency 
to X." 
If I say that it has a tendency-or that there is a tendency for it-to rain 
in Houston, or that it tends to rain in Houston, I am not saying that it will 
rain in Houston given certain conditions, which perhaps I have in mind. 
Rather, I am usually onlysaying that it rains with some frequency in Houston. 
I standardly make such a judgment with an eye to more or less frequent 
occurrences of rain in Houston in the past, probably the recent past, and not 
necessarily with an eye to predicting such occurrences given certain condi- 
tions in the future. If asked, for instance, to substantiate such a judgment, 
I would not try to create the conditions specified in the protasis of some 
hypothetical whose apodosis is "it rains in Houston," to see whether or not 
it did rain in such cases; I would rather point to more or less frequent cases 
of rain in the past, and that would be that. I could not, if asked, even begin 
to give any set of conditions under which it will definitely rain in Houston, 
and need not do so in order correctly to make the judgment that it tends 
to rain there. Perhaps I need a certain amount of knowledge about Houston's 
past rainfall to make the judgment; but I do not need to have expert or 
amateur knowledge of meteorology. Similarly, "he tends to wear red shirts" 
usually means that he does rather often wear them, and "this vase has a 
tendency to fall off the table" usually means that it has fallen off several times. 
There is no finite set of nontrivially specifiable conditions under which pos- 
sessors of tendencies mtlst do any finite set of nontrivially specified acts. Often 
to say that something tends to be a certain way is only to say that it often 
happens that the thing is that certain way. Often to say that a person has 
a tendency to do something is just to say that the person sometimes desires 
or wants to do it. 
The same holds of liabilities and pronenesses. If I tel1 you that this milk 
is liable to go sour, I am not telling you that given certain conditions you 
can logically conclude that it will go sour. And, if from what I say you do 
conclude that under certain conditions it will go sour, you are making a wrong 
inference. My basis for telling you that the milk is liable to go sour may be 
that milk from your dairy often does, or that it is a warm day and milk often 
does go sour on warm days. But even if the day is warm and your milk is 
from that dairy, and even if other conditions for milk's going sour are present, 
your milk need not go sour. That it does not go sour does not at all prove 
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that I was wrong to say that the milk was liable to go sour-though it may 
argue that you were lucky. 
A man who isprone to have accidents is not a man who will have one given 
certain conditions. He is a man who, as his record testifies, often does have 
accidents. We would be wrong to infer about such a man that, given certain 
conditions, he is absolutely certain to have an accident. A man who is suscep- 
tible to colds or prone to have colds is usually someone who often has had 
them; but he may be someone whose bodily defenses are functioning poorly. 
At any rate, it would be a mistake to irfer that he will get a cold under certain 
conditions. We say that it is likely to rain, or that Citation is likely to win, 
just because we cannot give a set of conditions under which it will rain for 
sure, or under which Citation will win for dead certain. We often say that 
a person is apt to be late if he often is-and that means often has been-late. 
Even if he is apt to be late, we cannot correctly infer that he will be late. 
Even if he is apt to be late in general, and apt to be late on this occasion, 
he may stilI on this occasion show up on time. Maybe the occasion is especially 
important to him. Or perhaps his wife hustles him off early. 
IV 
The problem Ryle's account is designed to clear up is an important one. 
SpecificaIly human dispositions have some connection with certain sorts of 
incidents taking place in certain sorts of situations. The problem is to say 
exactly in what the connection consists. It is not simply a matter of some 
general but merely contingent and'accidental fact that a possessor of a dispo- 
sition typically does certain things in certain circumstances. A strict and literal 
interpretation of Ryle's account has the virtue of recognizing this. On the 
other hand, as we have seen, the connection cannot consist in the "fact" that 
the possessor of a human disposition logically must do certain things given 
certain conditions. The relation between dispositions and their typical exer- 
cise is not one of logical implication. What then is it? If we make some inroads 
into this problem we can, I think, see what Ryle is getting at when he says 
that dispositiona1 statements are hypothetical. One reason Ryle says this is 
that it seems to account for the fact that dispositional statements are predic- 
tive. Unfortunately, as we have seen, dispositional statements are not predic- 
tive in the quasi-scientific way indicated by the strict interpretation of Ryleas 
analysis. Yet there is a sense in which dispositional statements are "predic- 
tive," and by exploring this sense we can better understand Ryle's meaning. 
Consider, for example, tendencies. Like other sorts of dispositions, tenden- 
cies bear logically upon expectations about what will happen. As Ryle puts 
it, '"Fido tends to howl when the moon shines'. . . licenses the hearer . . . 
positively to expect barking" (CM, 13 1). To say of, for example, some person 
that he has a certain tendency is to serve notice that certain things can be 
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expected: namely that he will, at some time in the future (perhaps soon, but 
not at any particular definite time) do what he has been said to have a ten- 
dency to do. If you tell me that you have a tendency to overeat, I will expect 
you to overeat now and again; equivalently, I will not be surprised or take 
it as unusual or out of the ordinary if you do on some occasion overeat. But 
on the other hand, if you do not overeat, even given that you had several 
good chances to do so, I will not correctly conclude that you were lying or 
mistaken about yourself, even though I may be mildly surprised. ("Tendency" 
in such cases may signify desire, not habitual occurrence.) For you may be 
dieting because of your tendency, or you may be sick and not now feel like 
eating, or so nervous that it has destroyed your appetite for days running. 
Again, if I learn that birds tend to fly over my property, I expect them to 
do so, and I will be mildly surprised if no birds come over it. But I do not 
correctly infer that some minimum number of them will fly over my property 
during some future time period. 
Tendencies are not a matter of some complicated certainty, but rather a 
matter of some often simple uncertainty. To affirm that something has a 
tendency is not to give anyone an inference-ticket; it is rather to furnish him 
with an expectation-ticket. The same thing holds for statements containing 
other dispositional notions. They license not inference or prediction of a 
quasi-scientific sort, but rather expectation. 
There are certainly differences between tendencies and liabilities, tenden- 
cies and likelihoods, liabilities and likelihoods, and so on.'" But all are used, 
as are a host of other concepts belonging to a diverse family, in propositions 
which serve notice to expect certain things, or equivalently not to be surprised 
if certain things transpire. The wider family includes not only "tends to," "is 
likely to," "is prone to," "is apt to," but also "does" (the habitual "does"), 
"may," "might," "might any minute," "is inclined to," "has an inclination 
to," "is about to," "is on the verge of," (colloquially) "is fixing to," "it will," 
and "it is certain to." The members of this family are alike in that they all 
serve to arouse expectation, given specific circumstances. But they differ one 
from another by the nature and degree of the expectation that they function 
to arouse. All expectation is not alike. I may expect you to come right away, 
or to come any minute now, or next Friday at 3100 p.m., or some time before 
the term ends, or either before the tenth of the month or after the fifteenth. 
Furthermore, I can expect with differing degrees of certainty that you will 
come, I may vaguely suspect, or "sort of have a hunch," that you will come; 
I may be pretty sure that you will come; or I may be absolutely certain. 
Perhaps I am taking a stab in the dark when I say that you will come; perhaps 
I have it on good authority; perhaps, like the rising of the sun, physics predicts 
it and it happens every day. The family of notions which can be used to arouse 
expectation differ one from another in the degree of certainty they are typi- 
cally usable to arouse, given certain circ~mstances.'~ If you telI me that John 
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will be here tomorrow and I believe you, I will expect him to be here tomorrow 
with a fair measure of certainty; I shall be fairly much surprised if he does 
not show up. But if you tell me that John has a tendency to come and I believe 
you, then I shall also expect him to come, but not so strongly; and if he does 
not come, I shall not be especially surprised or disturbed, or find anything 
out of the ordinary. If, again, you tell me that John might be in New York, 
I will not be surprised to find him there; but equally I will not be surprised 
not to find him there. If John is inclined to buy a new car, he may well do 
so and may well not do so. But if he is on the verge of buying the car, then 
we can with some increased assurance expect it any minute, or any day, now; 
it is very likely, though not of course absolutely certain, to happen. 
The differences, then, among these phrases which we use to arouse expec- 
tation are partly a matter of how close or far away in time the expected events 
are, and partly a matter of the degree of certainty about them which the 
phrases possess the job of leading us to have, which two matters, of course, 
are connected in many ways. Still all these phrases serve to arouse expecta- 
tion. What Ryle is really getting at with his analysis of dispositions is, I think, 
that dispositional statements license us to have certain expectations in certain 
situations, not really that they license us to infer in some quasi-scientific way 
that certain events will happen. 
It may be objected that this reading of Ryle omits one of the especially 
attractive features of the hypothetical analysis strictly interpreted, namely 
its account of how an appeal to dispostions functions as an explanation for 
actions. It cannot be denied that we explain a person" sudden outbursts as 
arising from anger, his picking up a heavy weight as the natural outcome 
of his strength, his passing by our house by reference to his perambulatory 
habits, and so forth. As we have seen, the literal interpretation of the Rylean 
analysis provides a very simple account of how such explanations work: we 
can explain a person's explosive curses by saying that he was angry, because 
his being angry just means that he emits explosive curses if the circumstances 
are right. All we add or imply in the explanation is that the circumstances 
were right. So it can be objected to my loosening up of the Rylean analysis 
that it renders it impossible to give an adequate account of dispositional 
explanations. For my own account seems to make dispositions too weak and 
watered-down for a proper explanation to rest on them. This objection is 
easily met. The explanatory force of dispositions seems not in fact to work 
in the way indicated by a strict interpretation of the hypothetical analysis. 
Rather the appeal to a disposition explains particular actions or events simply 
by saying that those particular actions might well have been expected. For 
example, they might have been expected because someone had a tendency 
to do them, or did them habitually, or before doing them was right on the 
brink of doing them; or because they are typical of or regularly done by 
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someone who is tending, able, or about to; or simply because they often or 
regularly happen. 
Still it might be said that the sort of explanation implied by my account 
is not a real explanation; or that it is only an explanation in a much weakened 
and watered-down way; or that if it is a kind of explanation, then it itself 
must be based on yet further grounds or some further rationale of some sort, 
which accounts for its actually being an explanation. But behind this sort 
of objection there is an excessively narrow view of "explanation" at work. 
The view is that a "real" explanation of a fact must conjure up and invoke 
a set of propositions which together logically entail that fact. Just possibly 
such logically suficient explanations are given, or at least sought, in certain 
scientific disciplines; perhaps the theoretical physicist wants his theory to 
consist of universal propositions from which, together with propositions 
describing particular matters of fact or particular circumstances, he can logi- 
cally deduce what will happen. But ordinary men conducting the ordinary 
affairs in which they use and understand explanations which appeal to dispo- 
sitions are not theoretical physicists. They are far from presuming to possess, 
or require, explanations of this sort. Ordinary people in common situations 
in life do not have one single form of explanation, but rather many; and the 
explanatory force of these many sorts of explanations does not rest on their 
all depending on some singIe universal explanatory scheme. We can see how 
many different sorts of things may be involved with the single word "because" 
just by imagining how many different sorts of "justifications" or "further 
elucidations" someone could give for his use of a because-sentence: "It always 
happens that way," "It has done that regularly for years," "It often turns out 
that way," "It just does happen that way from time to time." Explanations 
often appeal to what always, sometimes, or even occasionally happens, and 
they need not appeal to what-must-happen-if. 
Still, it may be objected, even if the view of dispositions with which I am 
trying to saddle Ryle does enable us to give an account of prediction and 
explanation by appeal to dispositions, it nevertheless does not enable us to 
give that account which Ryle's text suggests and which I describe in Part I. 
I agree that this is so. Still this is not a telling objection. For there are por- 
tions of Ryle's text which suggest that he more or less explicitlyrecognizes the 
main point I have been making throughout this paper. He says, for example, 
There are many dispositions the actualizations of which can take a wide and perhaps 
unlimitedvariety of shapes. . . . Ifwe wished to unpack all that is conveyed in describ- 
ing an animal as gregarious, we should . , . have to produce an injnite series of 
different hypothetical propositions. (CM, 44, my italics) 
Again, "the higher-grade dispositions of people . . . are, in general, . . . dispo- 
sitions the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous" (CM, 44, my 
italics). 
RYLE O N  DISPOSITIONS 6 1 
So, Ryle seems explicitly to recognize that if dispositions unpack into 
hypotheticals, it is only into infinite hypotheticals that they unpack. As I have 
argued, only finite hypotheticals can be the bases of the sort of explanation 
and prediction which was described in Part I. So, regardless of what the 
language of Ryle's text may suggest, explanation and prediction of that sort 
should not be thought of as what Ryle thinks dispositional statements pro- 
vide. 
NOTES 
1. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept ofMind(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949). All further 
references to this book will be made in the text, denoted CM. 
2. In some places he says or implies that sentences embodying dispositional words 
just are hypothetical statements (CM, 117), in other places that such sentences are elliptical 
for hypotheticals (CM, 85), and in other places that to assert that a dispositional property 
is truly predicable of some entity is to assert a hypothetical about it (CM, 89). This is not 
alf. We are told that to say that something has a dispositional property is to say that a 
certain hypothetical proposition is true of it (CM, 43), and that hypothetical propositions 
are lmphcitly conveyed in the ascription of dispositionaI properties (CM, 43). 
3. To be sure Ryle does not make the identification of dispositional statements and 
laws simply. In fact he clearly says that he does not think that dispositional statements 
are laws (CM, 123). Yet what he finds to be the difference between the two is revealing; 
it shows that in respect to their hypothetical character, and in respect of their use in 
inferring matters of fact from other matters of fact, laws and dispositional statements work 
exactly alike. Dispositional statements are distinct from laws for Ryle, not because they 
are not inference tickets while laws are; rather they are not laws only because they are 
not completely open or variable-i.e., universal-"for they mention particular things or 
persons" (CM, 123). Yet Ryle points out that they are partly open or variable. "To say 
that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, 
at any time, and in any parcel of water" (CM, 123). 
A law for Ryle would go: 
(x) (y) . . . (z) (F(x, y, . . . , z) implies G(x, y, . . . , 2)). 
A dispositional statement would go: 
(y) . . . (z) (F(a, y, . . . , z) implies G(a, y, . . . , z)). 
4. It is clear why someone might want to hold this. For it can seem difficult otherwise 
to make intelligible the possibility of making conclusions about a person's mental states 
from hls behavior. Ryle is concerned about what all of us should be concerned about 
but too seldom are, namely, how we can ever have grounds for saying something "mental" 
of a person, when that kind of something appears to go beyond what we can have evldence 
of. 
5. In making these remarks I have in mind that something's brittleness would be 
analyzed into a hypothetical proposition whose antecedent consists of a conjunction of 
"conditions" upon or involving it, and whose consequent consists of a disjunction of (types 
of) "events" that can befall it. 
6.  This does not mean that there is no way to test, or even to test conclusively, for 
knowing how to speak French. It only means that there is no single test specifiable once 
and for all prior to every particular case. What we can expect of someone who wishes 
to deceive us about his abilities is different from what we can expect of someone who 
is proud of his abilities and who wants, perhaps too much to be easily successful, to 
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convlnce us how able he IS. A taclturn man or a misanthrope behaves differently from 
a loudmouth or a Francophile. There are an  unlllnited number of different "paths" of 
testing for knowledge of French; each will at each stage depend on the responses of the 
subject at that point along the "path." (I am grateful to Thomas McElvain for discussio~xs 
which helped me clarify my ideas about this matter.) 
7. According to the tautology ment~oned earlier: (A and B) implies (C or D) = (A 
implies C) or (B implies D). 
8. We can perhaps conclusively verlfy it, but certainly not conclusiveIy falsify ~ t .  
9. Even if solubil~ty were not capable of being spelled out In terms of a finite hypo- 
thet~cal, t h ~ s  fact would only cast aspersion on the analysls of solubility as hypothetical. 
It does not save the analysis of intellectual abllity. 
10. Another immediate consequence 1s that dispositions analyzed as hypotheticals can 
d~ffer  from one another in kind, not by being d~fferent in respect of their hypothetical-ness 
and their consequent role in inference and predict~on, but rather only by the character 
of the protas~s and apodosis of the hypotheticals into whlch they are analyzable or to which 
they are equivalent. And indeed this is how Ryle distinguishes among the various sorts 
of dispositions. There are short-term and long-term dispos~tions, depending upon how 
long the events in the apodosis, whlch manifest the disposition, can be expected to keep 
happening. And there are single- and multi-track dispositions, depending upon how many 
different sorts of events and act~ons  there are in the apodosis, and possibly upon how 
many d~fferent sorts of c~rcumstances there are In the protasis. And these distinct~ons give 
Ryle a way of marking off the dispositions of people from the d~spositional properties 
of materials: "Now the higher-grade dispositions of people with which this inqulry is 
largely concerned are, In general, not single-track dispositions, but dispositions the exerclse 
of whlch are indefinitely heterogeneous" (CM, 44). But these sorts of differences are 
simply differences in the "packing" of  the apodosis, and possibly the protasis, if disposl- 
tions are read str~ctly as hypotheticals. 
I I.  There is another problem with this suggestion. The protasis of the hypothetical 
above contains a mental or psycholog~cal notion. But the whole tenor of The Corrcept of 
Miird requires-and indeed Ryle himself does seem to intend-that protasis and apodos~s 
need contain no reference to the mental. For as I said above the fundamental strategy 
of The Concept ofMifzd~s to argue againstathe mind" as a special realm and against mental 
events and processes as events and processes existing wlthin the special realm, and to do 
thrs by analyzing the mental element in human life as malnly dispositional. Now ~f the 
terms golng into the protasls and apodosis of the hypotheticals which analyze this disposi- 
tional rendering of the mental are all themselves mental or psychological, then the carrying 
out of the strategy would beg the question. An objector could always say about the hypo- 
thetical analysls that he accepts it but does not accept the conclusion Ryle thinks it points 
to, since the hypothetical analysis ~tself  refers to those special entities and processes whlch 
Ryle wants to attack. So there must be a t  least one hypothetical analysis of any disposi- 
tional statement, in which nothing clearly mental or psychological enters. 
12. This problem only lurked In the background in the prevlous two suggestions. W ~ t h  
this new suggestion there is still the problem that it contains psychological notions. 
13. However, the differences are not fully explained by saying that, while all these 
are hypotheticaIs, they are different sorts of hypotheticals, which sorts are distinguished 
by the kinds of things that enter into their protases and apodoses and by the complexity 
of these two parts of the hypothetical. 
14. But hypotheticals have the job of arousing only one degree of expectatton, given 
certain circumstances: absolute certainty. 
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15. These latter sorts of differences cannot be explained by a strict interpretation of 
Ryle's doctrine. Its analysls could not account for the varying degrees of certainty, or the 
varying strengths of expectation which the different phrases are typically usable to arouse. 
The strict Interpretation implies that my certainty, or my lack of it, that the expected events 
will happen IS simply a function of my trust, or my lack of it, in the truth of the disposi- 
tional statement itself. But the fact is that I may have complete confidence In a disposi- 
tlonal statement and still not be at  all sure that the events lt enables me to "predict" will 
occur. 
